ON HIPPO OF (POSSIBLY) RHEGIUM[1]

Hippo, the Presocratic philosopher and medical writer of the 5th century BC, is today best known for a pair of contemptuous references in Aristotle. One is a casual *praeteritio* in *Metaphysics* A.3, as Aristotle launches into his review of the Presocratic *archai*. He digresses to consider whether the ancient poets anticipated Thales' thesis that water is the first principle, then resumes as follows:

εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀρχαία τις αὕτη καὶ παλαιὰ τετύχηκεν οὖσα περὶ τῆς φύσεως ἡ δόξα, τάχ' ἂν ἄδηλον εἴη, Θαλῆς μέντοι λέγεται οὕτως ἀποφήνασθαι περὶ τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας (Ἵππωνα γὰρ οὐκ ἄν τις ἀξιώσειε θεῖναι μετὰ τούτων διὰ τὴν εὐτέλειαν αὐτοῦ τῆς διανοίας)· Ἀναξιμένης δὲ ἀέρα καὶ Διογένης πρότερον ὕδατος καὶ μάλιστ' ἀρχὴν τιθέασι τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων, Ἵππασος δὲ πῦρ ὁ Μεταποντῖνος καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τὰ τέτταρα...

'Well then, whether this doctrine about nature really is something ancient and venerable is perhaps unclear, but at any rate Thales is said to have declared himself thus about the first cause. Hippo no one would think fit to include with these <thinkers>, because of the cheapness [*euteleia*] of his thought. Anaximenes and Diogenes set down air as prior to water, and the principle above all of the simple bodies, while Hippasus of Metapontium and Heraclitus of Ephesus <set down> fire, and Empedocles the four <elements>…'[2]

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[1] Acknowledgements [suppressed for blind review]

[2] *Metaph.* A.3, 983b35-4a7: text is that of O. Primavesi in C. Steel (ed.), *Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha (Symposium Aristotelicum XVIII)* (Oxford, 2012), 467-516; translation is mine, with a debt to Ross (Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* trans. W.D. Ross (Oxford, 1942)). (Translations throughout are mine except as noted.) For discussion of the reasoning and sources of this passage cf. B. Snell, 'Die Nachrichten über die Lehren des Thales und die Anfänge der griechischen Philosophie- und Literaturgeschichte', *Philologus* 96 (1944), 170-82; A. Patzer, *Der Sophist Hippias als Philosophiehistoriker* (Freiburg, 1986); J. Mansfeld, 'Cratylus 402a-c: Plato or Hippias?', in L. Rossetti (ed.),

Aristotle here lists two advocates of air as *archê*, and two of fire. Thales and Hippo would make a neatly matching pair of hydromonists – except that Hippo does not deserve inclusion in the canon, as Aristotle goes out of his way to point out. Likewise in *De Anima*, in Aristotle's opening dialectical survey of earlier theories of the soul, air and fire are listed as principles advanced by Diogenes and Heraclitus respectively. Aristotle adds Alcmaeon to the latter camp, and continues:

τῶν δὲ φορτικωτέρων καὶ ὕδωρ τινὲς ἀπεφήναντο, καθάπερ Ἵππων· πεισθῆναι δ' ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῆς γονῆς, ὅτι πάντων ὑγρά· καὶ γὰρ ἐλέγχει τοὺς αἷμα φάσκοντας τὴν ψυχήν, ὅτι ἡ γονὴ οὐχ αἷμα· ταύτην δ' εἶναι τὴν πρώτην ψυχήν.

'Of the more vulgar [*phortikôterôn*] writers, some have declared it <soul> to be water, such as Hippo. They seem to have been persuaded by the fact that the seed of all animals is moist. For Hippo refutes those who claim that the soul is blood, on the ground that the seed is not blood, and <he claims> that this is the original soul.'[3]

This repeated dismissiveness is exceptional -- and, given the state of our evidence, mysterious. If Hippo's own writings had survived, we might be able to see that his reasoning *was* consistently shoddy, so as to make Aristotle's contempt perfectly

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Atti del Symposium Heraclituem 1991 1 (Rome, 1983), 43-55 (=Mansfeld 1983), cited as reprinted in his *Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy* (Assen, 1990) (=Mansfeld 1990), 84-96, at 88 n. 17, 90, 93 n. 35, and his 'Aristotle, Plato, and the Preplatonic doxography and chronography', in G. Cambiano (ed.), *Storiografia e dossografia nella filosofia antica* (Torino, 1986), 1-59 (=Mansfeld 1986), cited as reprinted in Mansfeld 1990, 22-83; and R. Barney, 'History and dialectic (*Metaphysics* A 3, 983a24-4b8)', also in Steel (ed.) 2012, 69-104.

[3] Aristotle, *De Anima* A.2 405b1-5: text is that of Aristotle, *De Anima*, ed. R.D. Hicks (trans., intro., notes) (Cambridge, 1907).

understandable.[4] But thanks to Aristotle's anathematization, Hippo was for the most part excluded from the doxographic tradition, except in medical contexts; even less of his thought has survived than for most of the Presocratics we can name. In what follows, my aim will be to set out the few pieces of the evidentiary jigsaw puzzle which have survived, both as an end in itself and to see what light might be shed on Aristotle's verdict.

I.

At a first glance, our evidence on Hippo is almost completely chaotic. He was born in Croton, or Rhegium, or Metapontum, or possibly Samos.[5] He believed in a single *archê*, water, according to Aristotle; but according to other sources, in an indeterminate 'moist';

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[4] *Euteleia* as a term of philosophical polemic is unparalleled in Aristotle; it appears in a wide range of contexts and applications as part of a network together with *phaulos* and contrasted with *kalon, gennaion, semnon*, etc. See e.g., *Part. An.* 683a26, *De div. per som.* 463b15, *Pol*. 1272b41, *Rhet.* 1390b24, 1408a13, *Poetics* 1458b22. The sense is clearly something like 'cheap' in the extended sense, or 'low-grade'; but Aristotle's usage provides no clues as to what would make a philosopher's thought count as such.

[5] Croton: *Anon. Lond.* XI.13; Rhegium: Hippolytus, *Ref.* I.16, Pseudo-Galen 18.7, Sextus Empiricus, *P.H.* III.30.11 and *A.M.* IX.361.4; Metapontum: Censorinus 7.2 (cf. 'Metapontum or as Aristoxenus says Samos', 5.2); Samos: Iamblichus *V.P.* 267 (in a list of Pythagoreans). Diels' attempt to reconcile all these seems optimistic, though not impossible ('Ueber die Excerpte von Menons Iatrika in dem Londoner Papyrus 137' *Hermes* 28 (1893), 406-34 at 420-1). Samos is of course the geographic outlier here, and plausibly explicable as guesswork influenced by the association with Pythagoreanism. We might thus tentatively take Hippo to have originated in Magna Graecia, and more specifically somewhere in the sole of the Italian boot: it would not have been difficult for his working life to include stays in all of Rhegium, Croton and Metapontum, and further travels to Samos and Athens are certainly not out of the question. But all this can only be highly speculative.

or earth; or two *archai*, water and fire. [6] He was a Pythagorean, or perhaps an atheist.[7] The charge of atheism, we are told, stemmed from his views about the soul, or perhaps from his rejection of non-perceptibles, or perhaps an irreligious epitaph.[8] Almost all these claims appear in much later texts, *en passant* in discussions of something else. Wherever

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[6] Water: Ar. *Metaph.* A.3, Simplicius, *Phys.* I.23.22 (=Theophrastus *Phus. Dox.* I), Hippolytus (DK38A3) et al.; the 'indeterminate moist', reported at Alexander *Metaph.* 26.21-3 *ad* 984a3 (DK38A6); earth, Ioann. Diac. *Alleg. in Hes. Theog.* 116 (Diels-Kranz 38A6, with a bracketed exclamation mark); two *archai*, Sextus Empiricus *PH* III.30, *AM* IX.361, Pseudo-Galen 18; cf. Hippolytus *Ref.* I.16 (with section III below).

[7] Pythagorean: Iamblichus *V.P.* 267, Claudian. Mamert. *de An.* 7, 121.1; atheist: *En passant* and with due caution at Simplicius *Phys.* 23.22; also [Simp.] *de An.* 32.16, Aelian *V.H.* II.31, Plutarch *Comm. Not.* 1075a, Clement *Prot.* 24, Athenaeus, *Deip.* XIII, 610b. Burkert takes the Pythagorean identification seriously, while noting the idiosyncrasies of Iamblichus' list -- presumably derived from Aristoxenus, as the shared presentation of Hippo as from Samos confirms (W. Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge Mass., 1972), 105 n. 40). Burkert also notes the Pythagorean number symbolism apparently at work in some of Hippo's medical doctrines (290 n. 62): 'in all things the number seven has the greatest power' (*in omnibus numerus septenarius plurimum possit*, Censorinus 7.2=DK38a16). There is otherwise remarkably little basis for the Pythagorean identification in the scraps of Hippo's thought we possess.

[8] On the basis of his *archê*-theory, Philoponus *de An*. 88.23-4; denial of non-perceptibles, pseudo-Alex., *Metaph.* 462.29, Asclepius 25.18; the epitaph, Alex. *Metaph.* 27.1, Clem. *Prot.* 55 (DK 38B2). The epitaph reads: 'This is the tomb of Hippo, whom Fate made equal to the immortal gods when he died' (Ἵππωνος τόδε σῆμα, τὸν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν ἶσον ἐποίησεν Μοῖρα καταφθίμενον). It is not obvious that this should be read as straightforwardly atheistic (i.e., Hippo no longer exists, and neither do the gods); alternatively one might take it as hubristically self-deifying in the manner of Empedocles (cf. DK112), or as asserting some mysterious interchange between human and divine (cf. Heraclitus B62 or the Orphic tablet DK1B18). Cf. Burkert 1972, 290n62.

Hippo appears in our sources, at least outside of the medical tradition, it is as a marginal figure. And marginal figures tend to be blurry.

Most of our information about Hippo, such as it is, can be grouped into three clusters. (1) We have his medical opinions, preserved in medical doxographic contexts, including the *Anonymus Londinensis*, the medical Book V of Aëtius, and Censorinus, who includes quite a bit of information about his embryology (DK38A12-18). (2) There are scattered references to Hippo in the Aristotelian tradition (including works by Alexander, Simplicius and Philoponus), usually aiming to elucidate Aristotle's allusions. (3) Most valuably for Hippo as *phusikos*, we have a few reports of his views on the *archai* from outside this Aristotelian context, most notably in Hippolytus. A category (4) of miscellaneous texts completes the picture: these include our one Diels-Kranz 'fragment', from a Homeric scholion.

My focus in this paper will be on what can be known about Hippo the *phusikos* rather than as a medical thinker, and so on categories (2) and (3). But I will first pause to briefly discuss a few 'miscellaneous' texts, beginning with Hippo's fragment. This is an argument that all waters come from the sea, cited as being from the third book of Crates' Homeric Studies:[9]

εἶπε δὲ τοῖς τρισίν, φησίν, ὅ τι καὶ οἱ μετὰ ταῦτα φυσικοὶ συνεφώνησαν, τὸ περιέχον τὴν γῆν κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος ὕδωρ Ὠκεανὸν εἶναι, ἐξ οὗπερ τὸ πότιμον. Ἵππων· 'τὰ γὰρ ὕδατα πινόμενα πάντα ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ δή που τὰ φρέατα βαθύτερα ἢ ἡ θάλασσά ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν πίνομεν· οὕτω γὰρ οὐκ <ἂν> ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης τὸ ὕδωρ εἴη, ἀλλ' ἄλλοθέν ποθεν. νῦν δὲ ἡ θάλασσα βαθυτέρα ἐστὶ τῶν ὑδάτων. ὅσα οὖν καθύπερθεν τῆς θαλάσσης ἐστί, πάντα ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἐστιν'. οὕτως τὰ αὐτὰ εἴρηκεν Ὁμήρωι.

[9] For an argument that Crates' source is likely to have been Hippias, see Barney 2012, 91. This seems all the more plausible given the apparently restricted circulation of Hippo's (non-medical) ideas in the Hellenistic period.

‘Then in the third book [of his *Homeric Studies*, Crates] says that the later natural scientists also agreed that the water which surrounds the earth for most of its extent is Ocean, and that fresh water comes from this. Hippo:

‘All drinking waters come from the sea. For the wells from which we drink are surely not deeper than the sea. For if they were, the water would come not from the sea but from somewhere else. But as it is, the sea is deeper than the waters. Now all waters that are higher than the sea come from the sea.’

Thus he says the same things as Homer.’[10]

It is worth noting, especially given Aristotle’s deprecation of Hippo’s ‘thought’ [*dianoia*], that this is a valid syllogism: (1) Our sources of fresh water are higher than the sea. (2) Sources of water higher than the sea ultimately come from the sea. (3) Therefore, fresh water comes from the sea. The argument dovetails nicely with the view Aristotle attributes to Thales (but may well have found in Hippo) that the earth rests on water (*Metaph*. 983b20). The underlying picture is perhaps traceable ultimately to the Mesopotamian belief in the *abzu*, a cthonic freshwater sea -- particularly if Hippo felt under no obligation to explain how ‘sea’ water could emerge from under the earth as fresh.

A few other ‘miscellaneous’ texts are worth mentioning. One is a scholion to Aristophanes *Clouds* (DK38A2) which reports that Aristophanes’ joke likening the *ouranos* of the natural scientists to an oven [*pnigeus*] (*Clouds* 95-7) was earlier directed by Cratinus in the *Panoptai* against Hippo. This suggests a certain contemporary notoriety on Hippo’s part; and a tandoor- or tagine-shaped cosmos would, I suppose, cohere well enough with Hippo’s idea that fire, originating from water, conquered it to compose the cosmos (cf. Hippolytus, *Ref*. I.16, discussed in (III) below). But the main point of the joke might simply be the familiar penchant of the *phusikoi* for explaining the

[10] Schol. Homer. Genev. p. 197 = Diels-Kranz 38B1; trans. J. Barnes, *Early Greek Philosophy* (Harmondsworth, 1987), with revisions.

cosmos through lowly physical analogies. We are also told, by a scholiast on Clement's *Protrepticus*, that Cratinus referred to Hippo as impious [*asebês*]: this is our only evidence that the charge of impiety was contemporaneous in origin (DK38A2).

Finally, there are a pair of tantalizing references to Hippo in Theophrastus' *Historia Plantarum*.[11] At I.3.5 he reports:

πᾶν γὰρ καὶ ἄγριον καὶ ἥμερόν φησιν Ἵππων γίνεσθαι τυγχάνον ἢ μὴ τυγχάνον θεραπείας. ἄκαρπα δὲ καὶ κάρπιμα καὶ ἀνθοφόρα καὶ ἀνανθῆ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους καὶ τὸν ἀέρα τὸν περιέχοντα·

'Hippo says that every <plant> comes to be as wild [*agrion*] or domestic [*hêmeron*] depending on whether or not it meets with cultivation; and fruitless and fruit-bearing and flowering and non-flowering on the basis of their locations and the surrounding air; and in the same way too deciduous and evergreen.'

And likewise at III.2.2:

καίτοι φησὶν Ἵππων ἅπαν καὶ ἥμερον καὶ ἄγριον εἶναι, καὶ θεραπευόμενον μὲν ἥμερον μὴ θεραπευόμενον δὲ ἄγριον, τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς λέγων τῇ δὲ οὐκ ὀρθῶς. ἐξαμελούμενον γὰρ ἅπαν χεῖρον γίνεται καὶ ἀπαγριοῦται, θεραπευόμενον δὲ οὐχ ἅπαν βέλτιον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.

'And yet Hippo says that every <plant> is both domestic and wild: domestic when cultivated and wild when not cultivated. In a way he speaks correctly and in a way not. For every <plant> becomes worse and wilder when neglected, but when cultivated not every one becomes better, as he claims.'

[11] *Hist. Plant.* I.3.5 and 3.2.2 (DK38A19): texts are from Theophrastus, *Enquiry into plants*, 2 vols., ed. and trans. A. Hort (Cambridge, Mass., 1916).

It is hard to see how this would fit into a scientific discussion of botanical theory, and we have no other evidence for Hippo's interest in such things. Rather it sounds like a clever point about language, an example of how we impose extrinsic, conventional, interest-dependent and local distinctions on nature -- the sort of point which we might expect to find in Antiphon or Prodicus. This brings home that while Hippo was a *phusikos*, he was a fifth-century *phusikos*, part of an era in which the line between science and sophistry was not clearly drawn (as we can see from the interests and writings of figures like Hippias and Antiphon). The line of argument is in a very general way reminiscent of Protagoras' miniature display-speech in Plato's *Protagoras*, arguing that whether or not something counts as good depends on the context and relations you consider -- e.g. olive oil is bad for plants and the hair of all animals except humans, but good for the external parts of human bodies (334b). The point could easily have been framed in terms of the canonical contrast between *nomos* and *phusis*: the human appellations given to things are local and variable, while the underlying *phusis* is one. If the evaluation in the last sentence, equating 'domesticated' with 'better', is part of Hippo's own agenda, then perhaps his point was to argue for the value of human *nomos* relative to *phusis* (an easier move in Greek, since *hêmeros*, 'domesticated', also means 'gentle'). Human cultivation improves and transforms all things -- even plants, those paradigmatic works of nature.

But what is most striking about these texts, taken together, is what a meager haul they present. Notably absent from the record are the sort of detailed *phusikai doxai* attested for more mainstream Presocratic figures: we know nothing about the mechanics of Hippo's cosmology, or his astronomical or meteorological views.[12] For Aristotle's

[12] D. Manetti suggests that Hippo's interests were biological *rather* than cosmological, and that 'l'immagine di Talete ha deformato quella di Ippone, riverberando su di lui un interesse cosmologico che forse gli era estraneo' (D. Manetti, 'Hippo Crotoniates 1T', *Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini* 1:1 (1992), 455-61 at 459). Manetti's point that Thales' (presumed) beliefs and interests might have shaped the reception of Hippo, as well as the other way around, is insightful and important; and she is right that it might have had the effect of making Hippo more of a cosmologist than he really was. However, our evidence for his theory of the *archê* or *archai* is comparatively strong (see section

gesture of exclusion laid down the law: Hippo is barely glimpsed in the central Theophrastan doxographical tradition, and absent altogether from Diogenes Laertius. His doctrines as a natural scientist, apart from his account of the *archai* (discussed in III), are almost entirely beyond recovery.

II.

I will not have much to say about group (1), medical texts -- though it is striking that Hippo seems to have flourished in the medical doxographic tradition while being marginalized in the philosophical one. Our most important text here is the *Anonymus Londinensis* -- *if,* at any rate, Diels is right to read 'Hippo' at XI.13.22 (in the papyrus, only the first three letters are legible), right that 'our' Hippo is intended, and right a third time that this part of the text goes back to the *Menôneia* (that is, the history of medicine allegedly compiled by Aristotle's pupil Meno, and circulating under both names in antiquity). The text deals with Hippo's theory of the origins of disease, which he derives from imbalances in moisture caused by excesses of heat or cold:

'But Hippon of Croton believes that there is in us a natural moisture [*oikeia hugrotês*] whereby we both perceive and live. Now whenever such moisture is in its natural [*oikeiôs*] condition, the animal is healthy, but when it dries up, the animal loses sensation and dies. This is the very reason why old men are dry and lack perception -- they are without moisture. Similarly the soles of the feet have no perception, since they have no share of moisture. And this <account> is as far as he goes. But in another book the same man says that the above-mentioned moisture changes through excess of heat and excess of cold, and brings on diseases. It changes, he says, in the direction of greater moistness,

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III); and Aristotle's anathematization is a sufficient explanation for doxographical silence on the details of his cosmology (for the existence of which we have at least one contemporary testimony, Cratinus in DK38A2). Moreover, as Diels notes, the account of the origins of disease in the *Anon. Lond.* is awfully vague for a writer whose interests are *primarily* medical.

or of greater dryness, of greater coarseness, of greater fineness, or into other <things>. In this manner he accounts for the cause of disease, but he does not enumerate the diseases that result from the various causes.' [13]

Again, the *dianoia* here gives no obvious cause for deprecation, in the Presocratic context. We get a standard use of observable evidence (the soles of the feet, old men), and explanatory economy in the use of a single pair of opposites (the hot and cold) to explain deviations from a healthy balance. As Diels notes, the vagueness of the account, especially as noted in the last sentence of the *Anon*.'s report, suggests that the author is more philosopher than doctor -- concerned to make the case for the causal sufficiency of his *archê*, but not really to give a medically helpful explanation of specific diseases.

It is tempting to trace the presence of Hippo in other early medical texts. The Hippo of the *Anon. Lond.* makes a perfect target for the critique of overly theorized approaches to medicine we find in *On Ancient Medicine* and *On the Nature of Man*: water, or *to hugron*, is just the kind of postulate to which these authors object.[14] Hippo's views also coincide strikingly with those of *Regimen I*, at least in the significance given to fire and water in the introductory sections II-IV; here too water is presented as

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[13] Translation is based on that of W.H.S. Jones, *The Medicial Writings of Anonymus Londinensis* (Cambridge, 1947), with consultation of the text (and Italian translation) of Manetti 1992. For discussion, see Diels 1893, 407-34, esp. 420-1; and D. Manetti, 'Doxographical deformation of medical tradition in the report of the Anonymus Londinensis on Philolaus', *ZPE* 83 (1990), 219-233).

[14] For the 'quarrel over method' in such texts as the *V.M.*, *Reg*. I, and *de Nat. Hom*., cf. J. Jouanna, *Hippocrates*, trans. M.B. DeBevoise (Baltimore, 1999), 282-5. G.E.R. Lloyd notes the relevance of Hippo to the *On Ancient Medicine* ('Who is Attacked in *On Ancient Medicine?'*, *Phronesis* 8 (1963), 108-26, at 118 n. 1), but does not treat him as a serious candidate to be its target, since the *Anon. Lond*. complains that he gave *no* account of the causes of particular diseases. But it seems to me uncertain whether this would exclude Hippo from the author's criticisms, or make him all the more subject to them.

nourishing fire, and as defined by both the cold and the moist. (However, the more specific medical claims of *Regimen* I do not particularly resemble anything attributed to Hippo; and they are hard to reconcile with the exclusive reliance on water in the *Anon. Lond.* account of disease.)

As for group (2), references in the Aristotelian commentary tradition, most of our texts are just what we would expect from Aristotle's own allusions. Hippo is typically presented as a hydromonist, and as such the intellectual sidekick of Thales. A wide variety of explanations are offered to explain and justify Aristotle's contempt. The most interesting of these is Alexander, in his *Metaphysics* commentary *ad loc.*:

Ἵππωνα ἱστοροῦσιν ἀρχὴν ἁπλῶς τὸ ὑγρὸν ἀδιορίστως ὑποθέσθαι, οὐ διασαφήσαντα πότερον ὕδωρ, ὡς Θαλῆς, ἢ ἀήρ, ὡς Ἀναξιμένης καὶ Διογένης. διὸ καὶ παραιτεῖται αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν ὡς ἐπιπόλαιον καὶ οὐδὲν διασαφοῦσαν. ἢ οὐχ ὡς ἀδιάρθρωτον αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν παραιτεῖται· οὐ γὰρ εἶπε διὰ τὴν εὐτέλειαν αὐτοῦ τῆς δόξης, ἀλλ' ὡς οὐκ ὀφείλοντα ἐν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἐγκαταριθμεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας εὐτέλειαν. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο εἶπε τὸ μετὰ τούτων, λέγων τῶν φιλοσόφων. τοῦτο δὲ λέγοι ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἄθεος ἦν·

> 'They report that Hippo set down as *archê* simply 'the moist' [*to hugron*], without differentiation, not making it clear whether <he meant> water, like Thales, or air, like Anaximenes and Diogenes.[15] Hence he <Aristotle> also rejects his doctrine as superficial and making nothing clear. Or <perhaps rather> he rejects his doctrine not as undifferentiated -- for he did not say 'because of the cheapness of his *doctrine*', but that he did not deserve to be numbered among the philosophers because of the cheapness of his *thought*.

[15] Only a Peripatetic under the spell of *Gen. et Cor.* II would think that water and air were equally good disambiguations of 'the moist'. But it is hard to say whether this complaint of ambiguity should be attributed to the unnamed interpreters themselves, or to Alexander, or as imputed by one or the other to Aristotle.

> For because of this he said 'among these', meaning the philosophers. And he would say this about him because he was an atheist.' (26.22-27.2)[16]

This is noteworthy in that it betrays some independent access to Hippo's thought – evidently someone, not Aristotle, took his *archê* to be 'the moist' without immediately identifying this with water (perhaps on the basis of the *Anon. Lond*. or its sources?). Alexander seems not to offer a verdict as to whether this reading is correct; his interest is merely to explain Aristotle's hostility, which the charge of atheism can do equally well.

It is interesting that the charge of atheism is most reliably preserved in this context of Aristotelian commentary.[17] The charge of impiety began in Hippo's own day: according to a scholion to Clement's *Protrepticus* (DK38A2), Cratinus referred to Hippo as an atheist.[18] Of course, that the charge was contemporary does not necessarily mean that it was well-founded or fair -- as Socrates notes in the *Apology* (18c), the charge of atheism was a standard one against the *phusikoi*. But it suggests that Hippo was a prominent *phusikos* of the day, sufficiently well known and 'modern' in approach for his speculation on the cosmos to be a juicy target. It is odd, then, that Hippo does not reliably figure in the standard doxographic *Atheistenkatalog* along with Diagoras, Theodore and Euhemerus.[19] It is hard to say whether this shows that the charge did not stick -- except in

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[16] Text from M. Hayduck, *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria* (*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 1) (Berlin, 1891).

[17] Simplicius *Phys.* 23.22, [Simp.] *de An.* 32.16, Philoponus *de An*. 88.23, Alex. *Metaph.* 27.1, pseudo-Alex., *Metaph.* 462.29, 670.27, Asclepius 25.18.

[18] And that Hippo was a target of Cratinus is confirmed by the scholion to the *Clouds* according to which Aristophanes' joke against the *phusikoi*, that they describe the heavens as a *pnigeus* and humans as the ashes, was earlier aimed by Cratinus in the *Panoptai* against Hippo (DK38A2).

[19] On which see D. Runia, 'Atheists in Aëtius: Text, translation and comments on *De Placitis* I.7.1-10', *Mnemosyne* 49 (1996), 542-76. Hippo is listed among atheists at Plutarch *Comm. Not.* 1075a, Aelian *VH* II.31, and Clement *Prot.* 24; but not at Aëtius I.7.1, Cicero *De Nat. Deor.* I.2, 63, 117, Sextus *A.M.* IX.51-9, or Theodoret 3.4.1.

the context of Aristotelian exegesis, where it proved especially useful -- or simply that Hippo was marginal even here. At any rate the variety of unconvincing grounds for the charge offered in our sources suggest that they, and perhaps the charge itself, are conjectures developed to account for Aristotle's hostility, rather than preserving a 5th-century tradition.

A final text of some interest, though again oriented to Aristotelian exegesis, is Philoponus *De Anima* 15.92.2ff. Philoponus suggests, plausibly enough, that Hippo is the unnamed figure to whom Aristotle alludes in *De Anima* when he speaks of earlier thinkers who identified the *archê* of soul with the cold [*to psuchron*], and says that they etymologized *psuchê* in terms of 'respiration and refrigeration [*katapsuxis*] (405b25-30). This kind of argument by (bogus) etymology was of course characteristic of fifth-century science (Aristotle's point is that such arguments are found on all sides); it helps to round out our picture of Hippo as a typical fifth-century *phusikos*, armed with all the modes of argument characteristic of his era.

III.

Group (3) of texts is the most intriguing for Hippo as *phusikos*, offering information on Hippo's views on the *archê* which outrun our Aristotelian sources. Here we may group together Sextus Empiricus, pseudo-Galen, and Hippolytus (in the first Book of his *Refutatio*, the so-called *Philosophoumena*). These sources are unanimous on two points: Hippo was from Rhegium, and far from being a monist he propounded a pair of *archai*, water and fire. It is not obvious how to locate or trace back these accounts in the doxographic tradition -- and, in the case of Hippolytus, one would very much like to know what Hippo is doing in the *Philosophoumena* in the first place. Hippo fits into no succession [*diadochê*] and no further use is made of him in the later books of the *Refutatio*.[20] Hippolytus' brief account is also somewhat confusing. Though it announces

[20] The chapter on Hippo concludes the discussion of the *phusikoi*, but the position has no obvious special significance. As Mansfeld notes, 'Someone, at any rate, had to be last' (J.

Hippo as a dualist, what little detail is added suggests that this is a misleading oversimplification:

Ἵ. δὲ <ὁ> Ῥηγῖνος ἀρχὰς ἔφη ψυχρὸν τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ θερμὸν τὸ πῦρ. γεννώμενον δὲ τὸ πῦρ ὑπὸ ὕδατος κατανικῆσαι τὴν τοῦ γεννήσαντος δύναμιν συστῆσαί τε τὸν κόσμον. τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ποτὲ μὲν ἐγκέφαλον λέγει, ποτὲ δὲ ὕδωρ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σπέρμα εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν ἐξ ὑγροῦ, ἐξ οὗ φησι ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι.

> 'Hippo of Rhegium said that the *archai* are the cold, water, and hot, fire. Fire, which is generated by water, defeats the power of its begetter and composes the cosmos. In one place he says that the soul is the brain, in another that it is water. For <he says that> the seed which is apparent to us is from moisture, from which he says the soul arises.'[21]

Now the question of Hippolytus' sources in the *Philosophoumena* is messy and controversial. Diels took his principal source to be ultimately Theophrastan; but his account of Hippolytus' sources and procedures has been strongly challenged by Osborne and Mansfeld.[22] And in the case of Hippo, Diels' assumption of a Theophrastan source seems highly implausible. For the opening sentence of the chapter, which proclaims Hippo to have been a two-*archai* theorist, stands in clear contradiction to the indubitably Theophrastan *Phus. Dox.* fr. 1 -- that is, with Simplicius' doxography in his commentary on *Physics* I, where Hippo is grouped with Thales as a hydromonist. One could perhaps

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Mansfeld, *Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus'* Elenchos *as a Source for Greek Philosophy* (Leiden, 1992) (=Mansfeld 1992), 36). Mansfeld suggests a kind of ring-composition as a possible rationale: perhaps Hippo is chosen so as to complement the first-discussed (and equally isolated) Thales. It may or may not be coincidence that Hippo's predecessor in I.15, Ecphantus, is also reported to have been a Pythagorean.

[21] Text as printed by Diels-Kranz (38A3).

[22] Cf. C. Osborne, *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy: Hippolytus of Rome and the Presocratics* (Ithaca, 1987), 187-211 and Mansfeld 1992, esp. 6-7, 14, and 40-43.

grant the contradiction and take it that Hippolytus' account represents a late garbling of the Theophrastan tradition. But Hippo is largely *absent* from that tradition as a thinker about the *archai*; instead he is included in the canon only on medical and physiological topics (sometimes extending to the nature of the soul).[23] So it becomes awkward to assume that the dualist features of Hippolytus' account must be 'Theophrastan' in origin.

Now the conflict here with Aristotle and Simplicius really only extends to the first sentence of Hippolytus' report, which classifies Hippo as a proponent of two *archai*. The account which follows by no means demands this interpretation: after all, if water generates fire, the former is surely an *archê* in a stronger sense than the latter. An *archê* is by name and function the first of all things, which generates the others. We may be reminded of a point Aristotle attributes to Thales at *Metaphysics* A.3, 983b23-4, that the hot comes from and lives off the moist – a point that Aristotle may well be retrojecting onto Thales from Hippo, together with other parts of his account.[24] That fire feeds off the moist is a point familiar both from biological and cosmological contexts (cf. Hippoc. *Reg.* I, Ar. *Meteor*. 355a3-5). And the difference in status given to water and to fire is confirmed by Hippo's reliance on water in the account of the soul (and of seed) given here. Likewise in our other sources, none of the medical or biological views attributed to Hippo make any marked use of fire: all invoke water (or 'the moist') as *archê*. At the same time, the two-*archai* reading is defensible in its way; for an *archê* is also standardly what rules all things, and fire is said to *defeat* water in order to compose the cosmos.

So if Hippolytus' report of Hippo on the development of the cosmos is accurate -- and we have nothing better to go on, and no evidence against it --, Hippo was unusual if not unique among Presocratic *phusikoi* in one very interesting way. For he *distributed* the

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[23] Since pseudo-Galen also belongs to the Rhegium+two-*archai* tradition, I take his report too as non-Theophrastan (fr. 18.14-15: see Diels *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin, 1879), 610). Apart from his report and Hippolytus', and the one 'Theophrastan' reference in Simplicius, Hippo appears in *Doxographi Graeci* only on medical and embryological questions (189-91, 194, 197, 418), including on the soul (Stobaeus I.49.9 = Aët. 4.3.9, 388) (Cf. Diels 1879, 683).

[24] Cf. Barney 2012, 88-92.

two roles of an *archê*, normally fused: water is the first thing, but fire is the thing which governs. We can see how a theory of this kind would cause some confusion among doxographers utterly reliant on classifications by *archê* to organize and present their material. Thus Hippolytus' first sentence, classifying Hippo as a two-*archai* theorist, seems to be not so much a misreading as an oversimplification, and one which even his own brief account of Hippo's cosmogony makes understandable.

To see how this particular oversimplification might have arisen, recall that the same two-*archai* reading is presented by Sextus and pseudo-Galen. Now Hippolytus elsewhere relies extensively either on Sextus himself and/or on Sextan sources.[25] Moreover, Mansfeld has argued that Hippolytus' discussion of Xenophanes in I.14 cannot be Theophrastan (for reasons of consistency with the *Phus. Dox.* similar to those I noted above);[26] and he notes that there is no evidence that Theophrastus discussed Ecphantus, the even more obscure figure who precedes Hippo as the subject of *Refutatio* I.15.[27] Moreover, Hippolytus' treatment in both I.14 and I.15 is skeptical in coloration. So in place of Diels' Theophrastan source for these chapters, Mansfeld postulates that Hippolytus in 14-15 is using a sceptical source, different from that used for the preceding Eleatics and atomists.[28] It seems plausible that the same should be said of the treatment of Hippo in I.16.

What confirms this is that the oversimplified presentation of Hippo as a two-*archai* theorist is actually particularly useful in – and, we might think, adapted to --

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[25] For Hippolytus' varied uses of Sextus and his sources, see Mansfeld 1992, 29 n. 8, 125-31, and 318-25. Cf. also K. Janacek, 'Hippolytus and Sextus Empiricus', *Eunomia* 3 (1959), 19-21.

[26] J. Mansfeld, 'Theophrasus and the Xenophanes Doxography', *Mnemosyne* (40) 286-312, cited as reprinted in Mansfeld 1990, 147-73.

[27] Mansfeld 1992, 37. Mansfeld takes chapter 16 as isolated, placing a 'caesura' between 15 and 16; but this seems to be a point about how Hippolytus constructs his traditions, not necessarily implying a change in his primary source.

[28] Mansfeld 1992, 36-9 at 37; cf. J. Mejer, 'Diogenes Laertius and his Hellenistic Background', *Hermes Einzelschriften* 40 (Wiesbaden, 1978), at 84 (and 65 with n. 14).

sceptical contexts. In Sextus Empiricus, Hippo is mentioned twice in closely parallel contexts. Each is a *diaphônia* argument – that is, an argument for sceptical *epochê* from the perennial disagreements among philosophers. *Diaphônia* arguments rely heavily on (and were likely a standard motivation for) doxography, since they proceed by enumeration of conflicting earlier theories. One of Sextus' references, at *AM* IX.361, is in a *diaphônia* argument about body, with Hippo figuring as one of those who believed in bodies as the elements of things. The other, which is very similar, is a *diaphônia* regarding the material *archê* (*PH* III.30ff.):

Φερεκύδης μὲν γὰρ ὁ Σύριος γῆν εἶπε τὴν πάντων εἶναι ἀρχήν, Θαλῆς δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος ὕδωρ, Ἀναξίμανδρος δὲ ὁ ἀκουστὴς τούτου τὸ ἄπειρον, Ἀναξιμένης δὲ καὶ Διογένης ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης ἀέρα, Ἵππασος δὲ ὁ Μεταποντῖνος πῦρ, Ξενοφάνης δὲ ὁ Κολοφώνιος γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ, Οἰνοπίδης δὲ ὁ Χῖος πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα, Ἵππων δὲ ὁ Ῥηγῖνος πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, Ὀνομάκριτος δὲ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ τοὺς Στωικοὺς πῦρ ἀέρα ὕδωρ γῆν...

> 'For Pherecydes of Syros declared earth to be the principle of all things, Thales of Miletus, water; Anaximander (his pupil), the Unlimited; Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia, air; Hippasus of Metapontum, fire; Xenophanes of Colophon, earth and water; Oenopides of Chios, fire and air; Hippo of Rhegium, fire and water; Onomacritus, in his *Orphica*, fire and water and earth; the school of Empedocles as well as the Stoics, fire, air, water and earth...'[29]

Now these enumerations are carefully contrived for an effect of mockery. And Hippo is much more valuable to them as a two-*archê* theorist than he would be as a redundant hydromonist. He contributes importantly to the impression that logical space has been virtually exhausted by the philosophers -- not only has every possible single *archê* been

[29] Text H. Mutschmann, *Sexti Empirici opera*, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1912); translation is from Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, trans. R.G. Bury (Cambridge, Mass., 1933).

tried, but *three* different pairings of them! The next move (Onomacritus, who propounded fire and water *and* earth), then looks like crazed one-upmanship, or possibly desperation. Two-*archai* theories are much less easy to come by than monistic ones, as we can see from how far Sextus has to cast his net here: Oenopides was a well-known astronomer, but to include him in this context is a bit of a stretch, and Onomacritus a shadowy much-forged producer of oracles. So it seems likely that the two-*archai* reading of Hippo emerges and comes to be preferred in this very context of doxography for the purposes of *diaphônia* argument. (This does not imply a sceptical source in any narrow sense: the basic form of *diaphonia* argument goes back at least to Isocrates *Antidosis* 268, and apparently to Xenophon and sophistic sources before him.)[30]

So, to conclude, it seems that Hippolytus I.16 represents a non-Theophrastan, broadly sceptical doxographical tradition, one also inherited by Sextus and pseudo-Galen. Notwithstanding this vague provenance, Hippolytus' report seems to me immensely valuable. For it is neither reducible to nor incompatible with Aristotle's report. On the contrary, it can explain how the two traditions got started. If Hippo's theory involved a single *archê* begetting its opposite, with the formation of the cosmos ensuing from the mastery of the second over the first, one can see *both* how Aristotle and Theophrastus could present Hippo as a hydromonist *and* how an alternative tradition, perhaps with a different doctrinal or doxographic agenda, could simplify in the other direction, opting to elevate fire to the status of a full *archê*, as presented in the first sentence of Hippolytus' report.

There is another respect in which Hippolytus' report commends itself as preserving potentially valuable nuance. His summary has the peculiarity that the each *archê* is given two names in apposition: both the cold [*psuchron*] and water, both fire and the hot. And in relation to the soul, the power of water is referred to under a third guise,

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[30] Cf. Mansfeld, 'Historical and philosophical aspects of Gorgias' "On What Is Not"', in L. Montoneri and F. Romano (eds.), *Gorgia e la Sofistica*, Siculorum Gymnasium 38 (Catania: 1985), 243-71, cited as reprinted in Mansfeld 1990, 97-125 (=Mansfeld 1985b); as well as Mansfeld 1986. The presence of the argument early in the medical tradition is striking: cf. *On the Nature of Man* I.

as the moist [*hugron*].[31] This raises the question whether all three terms were used by Hippo himself for his *archê*, and, if so, how they were related in his works. (Presumably any one of these terms *could* be a gloss on or misreporting of any of the others.) That Hippo's default term was (or was understood as equivalent to) water seems to be secured by Aristotle's use of him (following Hippias) as a hydromonist. But it is natural that Hippo would have spoken of it as *to hugron/hugrotês* in physiological and medical contexts, as per the *Anon. Lond.* report. And that Hippo may also have referred to his *archê* as *psuchron* is supported by Philoponus' plausible suggestion that it was he who etymologized *psuchê* in terms of *psuchron* (*De An.* 92.2ff.). We might also here recall the intriguing report from Alexander, cited in section (II) above, that Hippo was said to have called the *archê* 'the moist' in an 'undifferentiated' way. This passage is not as informative as it looks, since Alexander is simply reporting what others say in explanation of Aristotle's disparagement, and we would expect such explanations to be based on speculation as much as evidence. Moreover Alexander himself seems unpersuaded: he goes on to offer an alternative reading, based on the rather perceptive point that Aristotle criticises Hippo's *dianoia* rather than his *doxa*. Still, his report adds some support to the *Anon. Lond.* evidence that -- as we might in any case expect -- Hippo sometimes spoke of his *archê* in terms of *to hugron*.

In sum our evidence, taken together, suggests that Hippo spoke of water as the *archê*, and also, rather ingeniously, glossed this as *either* the power of the moist *or* the cold, depending on his purposes in various contexts -- the cold when contrasting the role

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[31] I do not think anything hangs on it here, but I assume that Hippo's ontology was along the general lines traced by Cornford (in relation to Anaxagoras), Heidel and Mourelatos: *to psuchron* and *to hugron* would be 'quality-things' or 'powers', not reducible to either a quality or a substance in Aristotelian terms. This makes any shuttling between the *to X* formulations and 'water' unsurprising. (F.M. Cornford, 'Anaxagoras' theory of matter-II', *Classical Quarterly* 24:2 (1930), 83-95 at 92-5; W.A. Heidel, 'Qualitative change in Presocratic philosophy', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 19 (1906), 333-79; A.P.D. Mourelatos, 'Heraclitus, Parmenides and the naive metaphysics of things', in E.N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos and R. Rorty eds. *Exegesis and Argument* (Assen, 1973), 16-48).

of fire as complementary cosmological sub-*archê*, or when playing with the eytmology *psuchron-psuchê*, the moist in connection with biology (including, as reported in Hippolytus, his account of the soul). Later reports then come to diverge from each other by focussing on one or another of the three: water in contexts which pair Hippo with Thales, the cold when contrasting him (as Alexander does) with Heraclitus, and the moist in medical and biological contexts. That Hippolytus includes all three terms therefore need not be taken as a sign of garbling, or even necessarily of multiple traditions: he may well be transmitting a comparatively full, detailed and nuanced source which preserved all three of Hippo's own modes of presentation.

IV.

As I have noted, our picture of Hippo's natural-scientific theories is radically incomplete. Nor do we have any evidence for what would later be called metaphysical views, or religious ideas -- except for the charge of atheism, which is uninformative inasmuch as it was standard against *phusikoi* of his time. We are in a much better position, however, when it comes to identifying his modes of argument. On the evidence I have assembled, Hippo offers a compendious example of what we might call the fifth-century toolkit: inferences from the observable to the unobservable and from familiar models to first principles; reasoning from biology to cosmology and back again; etymology used to link key terms and support claims about the underlying natures of things (cf. *in extenso* Plato's *Cratylus*); application of the *nomos*/*phusis* distinction; and even the occasional valid syllogism.[32]

Given the scantiness of our evidence, it is hard to say how far Hippo was an innovative thinker. His distribution of the two roles of the *archê*, such that fire is a quasi-*archê* posterior to water but more powerful than it, is non-standard and seems original.

[32] The most prominent contemporary strategy missing from this list is the deployment of canonical literary texts in support of scientific or philosophical conclusions. One wonders whether, prior to being enlisted by Hippias, Hippo himself might have presented his views about the *archê* as already adumbrated by Homer.

(However, one might less sympathetically see it as a throwback to Hesiodic 'genealogical' cosmogony.) In the end one can only join Leon Robin in a shrug: 'Quant à dire en quoi il a innové, c'est chose difficile en l'état de nos connaissances'.[33] But many scholars have been less restrained; indeed, it is fascinating how far modern scholars have gone out of their way to belittle Hippo's thought. To take a notable instance, Guthrie's report on Hippo is careful and full, but pointedly located in an Appendix entitled 'Some minor figures of the period'.[34] And his treatment of the evidence is almost crowded out by expressions of distaste: 'a typical eclectic... of no great originality', 'uninspired', 'hardly exciting' and, in parting: 'Such interest as Hippon has to offer arises in a left-handed way from his lack of distinction and originality'.[35] (This pervasive deprecation, very different from Guthrie's usual tone, starts to take on an air of *anxiety* -- but is Guthrie anxious to reassure the reader that he is no softer a judge of *dianoia* than Aristotle? Or to reassure himself that Aristotle was right, and that the loss of Hippo's ideas is no loss?)

Guthrie's dismissal of Hippo as an 'eclectic' is not found in any ancient report; but it represents a robust modern tradition, going back at least as far as Zeller and Gomperz. For Zeller, Hippo's whole generation 'lack originality and exhibit an eclecticism which clearly betrays the weariness of philosophical speculation about the physical world'.[36] Gomperz explains:

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[33] L. Robin, *La Pensée Grecque et les origines de l'esprit scientifique* (Paris, 1923), 156.

[34] W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1965), 354-8.

[35] On 354, 357 *bis*, and 358 respectively.

[36] E. Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy* 13th ed. rev. W. Nestle, trans. L.R. Palmer (New York, 1955), 86; cf. more fully *La Filosofia dei Greci nel suo sviluppo storico,* rev. R. Mondolfo, 3 pt. (Florence, 1969), 251-77. Cf. also Diels 1893,'ein etwas beschränkter Kopf wie Hippon', 421. On the similar use of the label 'eclectic' for Diogenes of Apollonia, cf. André Laks: 'Au-delà des réserves dont s'accompagne désormais son emploi, la dépréciation est restée. Diogène passe toujours pour un pauvre d'esprit, auquel seul Hippon est inférieur, ou, au mieux, pour un retardaire' (*Diogène d'Apollonie* (Lille, 1983), xxix).

> 'We range him here with the eclectics because he was obviously at pains to weld the teachings of Parmenides with those of Thales. Thus the van of his cosmic process was led by "the moist", from which "the cold" and "the warm" (water and fire) proceeded, with fire as the active cosmogonic principle, and water as the passive matter.'[37]

This is an interesting case study of modern doxography in action: in order to prove his rather odd thesis of Hippo as 'Parmenidean' and thus (?) eclectic, Gomperz has simply *added together* a suggestion in Alexander ('the moist' as undifferentiated *archê*) with an incompatible one in Hippolytus (two *archai*, water and fire, of which the former is explicitly identified with the moist).[38] The result, apparently rendering Hippo a *three*-archai theorist, is quite unsupported and scarcely coherent (and there is still nothing very Parmenidean about it, apart from the positing of a dualism in which one side is represented by fire). In modern scholarship, it seems, 'eclectic' has come to serve as the counterpart of 'atheist': a label used to justify contempt, while conveniently requiring little or no textual warrant.

Were it not for such enduring effects of Aristotelian hostility, the modern verdict on Hippo would likely have been very different. Our one fragment of Hippo is, after all, a valid syllogism from empirically plausible premises. Other reports present further arguments, and from true premises at that: seed *is* wet, the soles of the feet *are* dry, and the *psuchê* is indeed in the brain. Perhaps more impressively, Hippo exhibited a certain resourcefulness in the deployment of his *archê*, with its three different guises adapted to different contexts. He also offers a novel kind of solution to the most urgent problem for monism (how do contrariety and change ever arise?) in the quasi-*archê*-like role given to fire; and the Anaximenean-style transformations of the moist in the *Anon. Lond.* account

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[37] T. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*. 4 vols. trans. L. Magnus. (London, 1920) vol. 1, 377.

[38] The designation of Hippo as Parmenidean, repeated in Guthrie, presumably has in view the fire-night dualism of his 'Doxa'. But given that Parmenidean 'night' is not identified with water or the moist, the resemblance does not seem very close.

also show a determination to account fully for physical change. Moreover, medical and embryological views, at a remove from Aristotle's anathematization, were of sufficient interest to have won a secure place in the doxography. Obviously a fifth-century monistic *phusikos* was not in a position to be as strikingly original as his predecessors. But we nowadays credit philosophers with originality and skill on the basis of improved argumentation, explanatory resourcefulness and economy, and clever syntheses of earlier ideas -- on the basis, that is, of their *dianoia* as well as their *doxai*. And a careful and unbiased examination of our evidence suggests that Hippo, with his resourceful deployment of the fifth-century toolkit, would fare well by that more sophisticated standard.

In sum, if there ever was anything in Hippo's thought which deserved Aristotle's *euteleia* and *phortikoteros*, it is no longer recoverable to view.[39] And so his most

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[39] Since we can only speculate, the parallel case of Melissus is perhaps worth considering. Melissus is probably Aristotle's favourite target of abuse -- strikingly, Diogenes of Apollonia, a much more obvious counterpart to Hippo as a belated material monist, and a materialist about the soul, is treated in perfectly respectful terms (he is referred to without animus at *Gen et Corr.* 322b13, *Metaph*. A3 984a5, and *De an*. 405a21, and quoted *in extenso* in *Hist. An.* III.2). Melissus, like Hippo, gets labeled *phortikos* (*Phys.* 185a10-11); moreover, he is called *agroikoteros* (with Xenophanes) at *Metaph*. 986b27; he is repeatedly accused of fallacy (*Soph. El.* 167b13, 168b35, 181a27, *Phys.* 185a9, 186a7-8, a11); and he is repeatedly deprecated in comparison to Parmenides (*Phys*. 207a15, *Metaph*. 986b27). (On the other hand, he is sometimes referred to in more or less neutral terms, particularly together with Parmenides (*de Caelo* 298b17, *Phys*. 184b16); and his views do receive some discussion (even setting aside the *MXG*) rather than being the object of *praeteritio*. So Aristotle's verdict does not seem to be as unqualifiedly damning as it is on Hippo.) This leads one to wonder whether Aristotle's distaste for Melissus and Hippo has something to do with what they have in common: both are above all 'sidekick' figures, easy to deprecate the better to contrast with a more profound and original counterpart (Thales, Parmenides). Moreover, what annoys Aristotle about Melissus is evidently his habit of fallacious deduction; so perhaps Hippo's

enduring significance can only be as a sort of emblem – the Salieri of ancient philosophy, representative of the many who, successful and prominent in their day, have in the end been denied immortality; put more sceptically, as a symbol of the inscrutable and irreversible twists of fortune by which a canon comes to be formed.

'cheapness' has to do with a bogus showiness in reasoning. (Aristotle does not refer to Hippo as reasoning deductively, but the Crates fragment seems to indicate that he did so; and we might note his roughly syllogistic (and valid) refutation of the view that soul is blood in *de Anima* (405a3-5).)